What could go wrong?

Contributing sentiments towards policy:

56% : The weakness of Arab policies in the years following the Arab Spring and the Abraham Accords reinforced the feeling that Israel was capable of moulding a new Middle East based on its military and economic strength.
52% : The price of managing the conflict has risen significantly -- in human lives, money and Israel's status.
51% : At the heart of this strategy was a political and public struggle against Palestinian nationalism, while launching limited military operations in the West Bank and Gaza from time to time and dragging one's feet politically.
47% : The Judicial Coup and the decline in democracy born in the Settler Right's hothouses showed that the Occupation cannot be restricted to the other side of the Green Line: it poisons Israeli institutions, distorts the political rules of the game, and gives rise to a new and virulent strain of Jewish nationalism.
45% : Israel became two regimes at once: a democracy for Jews and a military dictatorship for millions of Palestinians, run by the IDF and the local governments of Hamas (in Gaza) and Fatah (in the West Bank).
44% : This was the war that the IDF was preparing for, and it therefore had some significant military achievements, mainly against Hezbollah (to which was added the unexpected reward of the fall of the Assad regime, which gave Israel the opportunity to grab large swathes of Syrian territory and prevent the restoration of Hezbollah).
44% : In other words, the war may have proven that Israel is capable of dealing well with any strategic threat to it, far or near, but it also showed that there is no military answer to the Palestinian question.
43% : However, in doing so, the war also inadvertently exposed Israel's dependence on the Palestinian Authority, which currently governs a population larger than that of Gaza.
38% : But the war also exposed Israel's shortcomings: total dependence on the United States and American munitions, a vulnerable home front, and a limited protective defence system.
37% : Israel agreed to end the war in exchange for the return of the captives, but Hamas was forced to give up its demand for the IDF to withdraw from all of Gaza.
37% : One price that has already been paid has been the collapse of Israel's international standing, and the outbreak of global grassroot hatred towards us, the Israelis, who are rightly perceived as completely supporting our military's conduct in Gaza.
36% : Instead, Israel stunned the world with a new war strategy cantered on the perpetual expulsion of millions from one location to another, while systematically destroying the entire infrastructure.
30% : Israel did not dare to take even a limited step such as distributing humanitarian aid itself, instead it initiated a botched operation using private contractors and dubious mercenaries in "Aid Centres," which claimed the lives of hundreds of starving people.
24% : It is not surprising that the main electoral platform of the prime minister who brought about that October 7 is now preventing another October 7. What Israel Really Fears Hamas did not consult with its allies before launching the October 7 attack; Israel, for its part, exploited the war to confront the Iranian axis and Tehran itself.

*Our bias meter rating uses data science including sentiment analysis, machine learning and our proprietary algorithm for determining biases in news articles. Bias scores are on a scale of -100% to 100% with higher negative scores being more liberal and higher positive scores being more conservative, and 0% being neutral. The rating is an independent analysis and is not affiliated nor sponsored by the news source or any other organization.