International trade law stands out among international regimes because the WTO enforcement system creates credible material sanctions, which most environmental and human-rights agreements lack. This …Read MoreInternational trade law stands out among international regimes because the WTO enforcement system creates credible material sanctions, which most environmental and human-rights agreements lack. This institutional asymmetry means that integrating environmental clauses into trade agreements is not merely symbolic but strategically shifts the enforcement venue to the only arena where compliance can be compelled. However, embedding environmental obligations into trade frameworks also restructures bargaining dynamics. States with export-dependent economies face stronger incentives to comply, while highly industrialized states may internalize the costs more easily, generating uneven burdens and potential distributive conflict. Despite these challenges, the accelerating severity of environmental degradation suggests that soft-law environmental cooperation is insufficient. Leveraging the trade system’s unique enforcement capacity, even at the cost of economic adjustment, is therefore justified because environmental collapse constitutes a cross-border survival issue that no state can mitigate unilaterally.Read Less
International trade law stands out among international regimes because the WTO enforcement system creates credible material sanctions, which most environmental and human-rights agreements lack. This …Read MoreInternational trade law stands out among international regimes because the WTO enforcement system creates credible material sanctions, which most environmental and human-rights agreements lack. This institutional asymmetry means that integrating environmental clauses into trade agreements is not merely symbolic but strategically shifts the enforcement venue to the only arena where compliance can be compelled. However, embedding environmental obligations into trade frameworks also restructures bargaining dynamics. States with export-dependent economies face stronger incentives to comply, while highly industrialized states may internalize the costs more easily, generating uneven burdens and potential distributive conflict. Despite these challenges, the accelerating severity of environmental degradation suggests that soft-law environmental cooperation is insufficient. Leveraging the trade system’s unique enforcement capacity, even at the cost of economic adjustment, is therefore justified because environmental collapse constitutes a cross-border survival issue that no state can mitigate unilaterally. Read Less