No way, it is theoritically feasible but only under the designed ideal preconditions. In other words, it will be practically very difficult.
First, agreement on a universal carbon pricing …Read MoreNo way, it is theoritically feasible but only under the designed ideal preconditions. In other words, it will be practically very difficult.
First, agreement on a universal carbon pricing mechanism is constrained by deep structural differences among states. Countries face vastly different levels of economic development, energy dependence, industrial structure, and historical responsibility for emissions. A uniform global carbon price would impose disproportionate costs on developing and energy-exporting countries while offering uneven benefits. These asymmetries make consensus politically costly: governments are accountable to domestic voters, industries, and labor market, not to abstract global efficiency. As a result, even states accepting the science of climate change often reject binding price levels that threaten competitiveness or social stability.
Second, enforcement and sovereignty concerns significantly undermine feasibility. Unlike national carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, a global carbon pricing mechanism would require cross-border monitoring, verification, and enforcement for the international system lacking a strong central authority. States remain reluctant to cede fiscal sovereignty, especially over taxation, which is one of the core attributes of state power. Without credible enforement, global carbon pricing risks becoming symbolic, encouraging free-riding and selective compliance rather than genunie emissions reduction. Read Less
I think it will be challenging, but it is necessary.
No way, it is theoritically feasible but only under the designed ideal preconditions. In other words, it will be practically very difficult.
First, agreement on a universal carbon pricing …Read MoreNo way, it is theoritically feasible but only under the designed ideal preconditions. In other words, it will be practically very difficult.
First, agreement on a universal carbon pricing mechanism is constrained by deep structural differences among states. Countries face vastly different levels of economic development, energy dependence, industrial structure, and historical responsibility for emissions. A uniform global carbon price would impose disproportionate costs on developing and energy-exporting countries while offering uneven benefits. These asymmetries make consensus politically costly: governments are accountable to domestic voters, industries, and labor market, not to abstract global efficiency. As a result, even states accepting the science of climate change often reject binding price levels that threaten competitiveness or social stability.
Second, enforcement and sovereignty concerns significantly undermine feasibility. Unlike national carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, a global carbon pricing mechanism would require cross-border monitoring, verification, and enforcement for the international system lacking a strong central authority. States remain reluctant to cede fiscal sovereignty, especially over taxation, which is one of the core attributes of state power. Without credible enforement, global carbon pricing risks becoming symbolic, encouraging free-riding and selective compliance rather than genunie emissions reduction. Read Less