What Can the U.S. Do About Pakistan?

Contributing sentiments towards policy:

61% : The call for cultural and political autonomy by Islamic scholars transformed into a demand for a separate nation.
58% : The Army emerged as the most powerful institution, positioning itself as the guardian of national ideology and territorial integrity.
52% : Fearing the demographic and political dominance of Bengali-speaking East Pakistan -- home to the majority of the country's population -- the Urdu-speaking Punjabi elite of West Pakistan engineered a reorganization, merging the provinces of West Pakistan into a single administrative entity to counterbalance the East's electoral weight.
49% : Zia's rule entrenched Pakistan's Islamization, transforming it into a state where national policy and identity were determined by hardline Sunni orthodoxy.
42% : In the early 1990s, Pakistan-backed insurgent groups conducted a campaign of targeted assassinations and public intimidation aimed at the minority Hindu population in the Kashmir valley.
40% : Engagement with Pakistan should be transactional and conditional, focused not on resolving Pakistan's ideological grievances -- but on limiting the fallout from a state that has weaponized instability and nuclear escalation as leverage.

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